Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
Diamantoudi, Effrosyni (Concordia University)
Macho Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Xue, Licun (McGill University)

Data:	2015
Resum:	We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized on all the issues. Examples of such games are several Örms competing in multiple markets, and countries negotiating both a trade agreement (through, e. g. , WTO) and an environmental agreement (e. g. , Kyoto Protocol). We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values for partition function games to issue-externality games. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment. The solution concept that we propose can be applied to many interesting games, including intertemporal situations where players meet sequentially.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2009-7616 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-31962 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014SGR-142 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEV-2011-0075
Nota:	Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), ICREA Academia
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Matèria:	Externalities ; Cooperative game theory ; Shapley value ; Linked issues
Publicat a:	Economic theory, Vol. 60, Num. 2 (2015) , p. 315-343, ISSN 1432-0479

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0867-x

Postprint 38 p, 701.6 KB

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