The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira (Universidade de São Paulo)

Data:	2016
Resum:	We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer-seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results concerning buyers and sellers' equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out that, by playing first, sellers are able to instigate an outcome that corresponds to the sellers' optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología ECO2015-63679-P Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014SGR-142 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563
Nota:	Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (ECO2015-63679-P), Generalitat de Catalunya (2014SGR-142), the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and ICREA Academia.
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Matèria:	Assignment game ; Competitive price ; Optimal matching ; Competitive rule
Publicat a:	Economic theory, September 2016, p. 1-21, ISSN 1432-0479

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0997-9

Postprint 28 p, 694.1 KB

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