Social-status ranking : a hidden channel to gender inequality under competition
Schram, Arthur (University of Amsterdam)
Brandts, Jordi (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica)
Gërxhani, Klarita (European University Institute)

Data:	2019
Resum:	Competition involves two main dimensions, a rivalry for resources and the ranking of relative performance. If socially recognized, the latter yields a ranking in terms of social status. The rivalry for resources resulting from competitive incentives has been found to negatively affect women's performance relative to that of men. However, little is known about gender differences in the performance consequences of social-status ranking. In our experiments we introduce a novel design that allows us to isolate the effects of status ranking from those caused by a rivalry for resources. Subjects do a time-limited task where they need to search for numbers and add them up. Performance is straightforwardly measured by the number of correct summations. When there is no status ranking we find no gender differences in the number of attempted summations or in performance. By contrast, when there is status ranking men significantly increase the number of attempted summations as well as the number of correct summations. Remarkably, when women are subjected to status ranking, they significantly decrease the number of attempted summations. The net result is striking. With status ranking men attempt more summations and correctly solve many more than women. These differences are markedly large and statistically highly significant. Our results suggest that increased participation in competitive environments could harm women's labor market success along a hidden channel.
Ajuts:	Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014-SGR-510 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2014-59302-P
Nota:	Acknowledgements Much of the work reported in this paper was done while the first and third authors were visiting the University of Pompeu Fabra and the Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica in Barcelona. We are grateful to both institutions for their hospitality. We also thank the Research Priority Area Behavioral Economics of the University of Amsterdam, the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) for financial support
Nota:	Altres ajuts: SEV2015-0563
Drets:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Publicat a:	Experimental Economics, Vol. 22 Núm. 2 (March 2019) , p. 396-418, ISSN 1386-4157

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9563-6

23 p, 793.0 KB

El registre apareix a les col·leccions:
Articles > Articles de recerca
Articles > Articles publicats