Home > Articles > Published articles > Goal-oriented agents in a market |
Date: | 2021 |
Abstract: | We consider a market where "standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goal-oriented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the "trigger") to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goal-oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments. |
Grants: | Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación CEX2019-000915-S Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación PGC2018-094348-B-I00 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017/SGR-711 |
Note: | Altres ajuts: acords transformatius de la UAB |
Note: | Altres ajuts: GREEN-Econ research project (ANR-16-CE03-0005) ; ICREA Academia programme |
Rights: | Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. |
Language: | Anglès |
Document: | Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
Subject: | Goal-oriented agents ; Incentives ; Matching market |
Published in: | Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 84 (june 2021) , p. 102378, ISSN 0167-4870 |
17 p, 590.1 KB |