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Pàgina inicial > Articles > Articles publicats > Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game : |
Data: | 2023 |
Descripció: | 32 pàg. |
Resum: | In the one-sided assignment game, any two agents can form a trade; they can decide to form a partnership and agree on how to share the surplus created. Contrary to the two-sided assignment game, stable outcomes often fail to exist in the one-sided assignment game. Hence the core, which coincides with the set of stable payoffs, may be empty. We introduce the idea of tradewise-stable (t-stable) outcomes: they are individually rational outcomes where all trades are stable; that is, no matched agent can form a blocking pair with any other agent, neither matched nor unmatched. We propose the set of constrained-optimal (optimal) t-stable outcomes, the set of the maximal elements of the set of t-stable outcomes, as a natural solution concept for this game. We prove that this set is non-empty, it coincides with the set of stable outcomes when the core is non-empty, and it satisfies similar properties to the set of stable outcomes even when the core is empty. We propose a partnership formation process that starts withthe outcome where every player stands alone, goes through steps where the set of active players expands, always forming t-stable outcomes, and ends in an (in any) optimal t-stable outcome. Finally, we also use the new concept to establish conditions under which the core is non-empty. |
Ajuts: | Agencia Estatal de Investigación PGC2018-094348-B-I00 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017/SGR-711 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación CEX2019-000915-S |
Nota: | Altres ajuts: acords transformatius de la UAB ; ICREA Academia programme |
Drets: | Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. |
Llengua: | Anglès |
Document: | Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
Matèria: | Matching ; Assignment game ; Stability ; Core ; Trade ; Tradewise-stable |
Publicat a: | Economic theory, 6 January (2023), ISSN 1432-0479 |
32 p, 511.3 KB |