Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies : the value of phenomenal consciousness
Shepherd, Joshua (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Date:	2024
Abstract:	Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness-valenced or affective experience-is essential to consciousness's moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper, I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects for valence sentientism in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value.
Grants:	European Commission 757698
Note:	Altres ajuts: acords transformatius de la UAB
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Phenomenal consciousness ; Moral status ; AI sentience ; Zombies
Published in:	AI & society, (January 2024) , ISSN 1435-5655

DOI: 10.1007/s00146-023-01835-6

11 p, 784.3 KB

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