Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

Data:	2016
Resum:	We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings, where these conditions are satisfied.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología ECO2009-07616 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-31962 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014-SGR-142
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Matèria:	Contests ; Auctions ; Discrimination
Publicat a:	International economic review, Vol. 57, Núm. 3 (2016) , ISSN 0020-6598

DOI: 10.1111/iere.12179

Postprint 50 p, 864.8 KB

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