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Resultats globals: 14 registres trobats en 0.02 segons.
Articles, 3 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 11 registres trobats
Articles 3 registres trobats  
1.
50 p, 864.8 KB Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability / Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. [...]
2016 - 10.1111/iere.12179
International economic review, Vol. 57, Núm. 3 (2016)  
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2.
20 p, 607.8 KB Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information / Clippel, Geoffroy de (Brown University) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. [...]
2012 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 75, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 413-423  
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3.
10 p, 585.3 KB Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities / Macho Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Wettstein, David (University of Negev)
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. [...]
2010 - 10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0
International journal of game theory, Vol. 39, Num. 1 (2010) , p. 177-184  
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Documents de recerca 11 registres trobats  1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
1.
20 p, 277.0 KB Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information / Clippel, Geoffroy de ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 813.10)  
Registre complet - Creative Commons
2.
18 p, 229.3 KB Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities / Macho Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. [...]
2008 (Working papers ; 758.08)  
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3.
29 p, 205.6 KB Bidding for the surplus : a non-cooperative approach to the shapley value / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
2006 (Working papers ; 461.00) - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2704  
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4.
21 p, 141.9 KB In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 463.00)  
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5.
14 p, 211.4 KB Bidding for the surplus : realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments / Mutuswami, Suresh ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 479.01)  
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6.
36 p, 365.4 KB An ordinal shapley value for economic environments / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 560.03) - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007  
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7.
7 p, 156.3 KB Forming efficient networks / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.
2006 (Working papers ; 609.04)  
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8.
29 p, 282.2 KB Sharing the surplus : a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities / Macho Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 611.04)  
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9.
32 p, 337.3 KB An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version) / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 634.04)  
Registre complet - Creative Commons
10.
23 p, 250.7 KB Efficient bidding with externalities / Macho Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 641.05) - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.002  
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Documents de recerca : 11 registres trobats   1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
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